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ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
By
Gabrielle Gilbeau*
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration and the Constitution1 is authored by Peter B. Rutledge, a professor of
Law and the Herman E. Talmadge Chair at the University of Georgia School of law.
Rutledge is an internationally recognized figure in the field of international dispute
resolution. The culmination of years of thinking, speaking, teaching and writing about
arbitration inspired Rutledge to write Arbitration and the Constitution. Many of
Rutledge’s insights into the field of arbitration and the Constitution are a result of
conversations with other professors, judges, lawyers and students.2
Arbitration and the Constitution, while not the first publication relating to this
subject, examines the compatibility of arbitration and the Constitution using a novel,
comprehensive, and methodical method. Notably, Rutledge sets out to achieve two
separate goals with his methodical examination of the constitutionality of arbitration.3
Rutledge first charts the breaking down of the separation between arbitration and the
Constitution and then provides a critique of those changes.4
Rutledge introduces the thesis of his work, the theory of “seepage 5,” rather than
direct doctrinal influences, to examine the relationship that arbitration and constitutional
law have upon each other. He asserts that constitutional norms infiltrate arbitration law
through the actions of all three branches of government, shaping the future course of
arbitration.6 This focus on “seepage” allows Rutledge to examine diverse case law and
*

Gabrielle Gilbeau is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2015 Juris
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
1

PETER RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013).

2

Id. at ix.

3

Id. at 5 (“First, as a positive matter, the book aims to chart systematically the breakdown of the wall
separating the two disciplines and the alloying of their various principles. Second, as a normative matter,
the book also (at times) critiques these developments.”).
4

Id.

5

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 5 (“Over the past half century, constitutional norms increasingly have worked
their way into arbitration law and, to a lesser extent, arbitration law has influenced the development of
constitutional norms. Tellingly, this seepage between the two disciplines has not occurred with a great deal
of systemic thought or deliberation. Instead, it has tended to take place through incremental developments
in various fields of arbitration, often occurring in isolation of each other and with little consideration of the
broader implications of the growing interconnectivity of these two disciplines.”).
6

Id. (“[S]eepage takes various forms. In some cases, constitutional norms have affected arbitration law
through the design of treaties or statutes by the executive or legislative branches. In other cases,
constitutional norms have affected arbitration law through judicial interpretation of those treaties or
statutes.”).
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move beyond familiar significant cases. Starting with Mitsubishi, Rutledge begins his
writing with the downfall of the non-arbitrability doctrine, allowing for the initial
breakdown of the wall between arbitration and the Constitution.7 He then uses a mixture
of novel cases to iterate the various arguments for the constitutionality of arbitration.
II. OVERVIEW
Arbitration and the Constitution is organized into three sections, each containing
two chapters, for a total of six distinct chapters. Every chapter/section contains a short
introduction and conclusion. Although the book covers a wide breadth of material, it is
fairly short at just over 200 pages.8
The book’s first section discusses issues relating to the separation of powers of to
judicial review and executive powers. Chapter One examines whether there are
“structural limits on Congress’s ability to require judicial enforcement of an arbitrator’s
award absent de novo review of the award.”9 Chapter Two focuses on “separation-ofpowers issues raised by more specialized forms of arbitration.”10
The second section of the book also examines separation of powers, but focuses
on vertical separation-of-powers principles involving federalism and the states.11 Chapter
Three looks at the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)12 and how it effects the states.13
Chapter Four discusses choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements and resulting
federalism concerns.14
The third section focuses on “the relationship between arbitration and individual
liberties.”15 Chapter Five tests whether arbitration should be considered “state action” and
the due process issues involved in arbitration.16 Chapter Six looks at other constitutional

7

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

8

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1.

9

Id. at 9.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-307(2012).

13

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 10.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id. at 10-11.
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liberties, such as the right to a jury trial, and explores why an arbitration agreement is a
valid waiver of one’s constitutional rights.17
III.

PART I. ARBITRATION AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Chapter One: Arbitration and Judicial Review

Chapter One opens by examining whether arbitration is incompatible with the
constitutionally-granted jurisdiction of Article III18 courts.19 Rutledge notes that prior to
the twentieth century, arbitration agreements were rarely enforced as the agreements were
viewed as “unenforceable attempts to appropriate [the court’s] jurisdiction.”20 Early
courts did not anchor their decisions on Article III. Most courts prior to the twentieth
century relied on the “jurisdictional ouster” argument to invalidate arbitration clauses,
which they deemed to be contrary to public policy.21 Presently, Article III attacks upon
arbitration have consistently been rejected by the Supreme Court.22
Rutledge examines several justifications used to support the constitutionality of
arbitration with regard to Article III courts. Rutledge first looks at the argument that
arbitration is valid because the parties “have waived their right to an Article III forum.” 23
Rutledge finds this reasoning, supported by CFTC v. Schor,24 troublesome, taking issue
with the presumption that Article III confers onto individuals both personal rights, which
may be waived, and non-personal rights, which are nonwaivable.25

17

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 11.

18

See U.S. CONST., art. III, §1 (“The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
19

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 16.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 53.

23

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 18.

24

CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-53 (1986) (asserting that Article III confers a “personal right” by
citing dicta from earlier decisions); but see Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L REV. 1 (1997) (“Even the Court’s Decision in CFTC v.
Schor which accepted denial of an Article III court in one context, recognized that a broad denial of the
Article III jurisdiction might well be unconstitutional even if parties had waived their rights.”)
25

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 18.
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Rutledge examines the language of Article III, as well as several cases, to support
his conclusion that Article III rights are not personal rights to individuals, which are
subject to waiver.26 He states that “[t]extually, it is difficult to argue that Article III
confers a personal right.”27 Rutledge posits that, structurally, Article III does not support
the conclusion that it provides for a personal right, as the first articles of the Constitution
focus on the “structural organization of our [] government; most of the discussion of
rights appears in the amendments.”28 This section of the book, however, is very brief,
and Rutledge does not hash out his arguments as completely as possible to ensure clarity
is achieved for his reader.
The book then moves on to a very brief examination of two other justifications for
the permissibility of arbitration in regard to Article III jurisdiction, before settling upon
the “appellate review theory” as the most convincing rationale for the permissibility of
arbitration with regard to Article III.29 Rutledge does not go into much detail on the other
two possible justifications for permissibility of arbitration with regard to Article III,
devoting just a short paragraph to each.30
The appellate review theory establishes the presumption that arbitration is valid,
because the provision of judicial review of arbitral awards provides enough oversight by
constitutional courts to satisfy the requirements of Article III. 31 The theory is rooted in
two sets of values: the benefits of Article III courts and the benefits of non-Article III
tribunals.32 Rutledge lists the benefits of Article III courts, including separation of
powers, fairness, and judicial integrity, and weighs them against the benefits of nonArticle III entities, which include expertise, efficiency in governmental functions,
flexibility, fairness, and sovereign immunity.33 The text goes on to support a modified
appellate review theory, where there is at least some degree of Article III review of
26

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (demonstrating how separation of powers principles
generally prohibit one branch from performing the functions of another).; see also U.S. Bancorp Mtg Co. v.
Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S.. 18 (1994) (supporting the idea that public interests are undermined when the
judiciary is undermined).
27

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 19.

28

Id.

29

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 24-25 (looking at a literalist interpretation method and distinction between
“cases” and “controversies” method of justification for the constitutionality of arbitration).
30

Id. at 24-25.

31

Id. at 25-26; see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62-65 (1932).; see also Richard H Fallon, Jr., Of
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 933 (1988) (“The core
claim of [appellate] review theory is that sufficiently searching review of a legislative court’s or
administrative agency’s decisions by a constitutional court will always satisfy the requirements of Article
III.”).
32

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 34.

33

Id. at 34-36.
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arbitral decisions, but deference to non-Article III entities remains paramount.34 Rutledge
concludes that the appellate review theory supports the constitutionality of the
jurisdictional oust of Article III courts by arbitral agreements by carefully balancing the
values of each against the other.35
B. Chapter Two: Arbitration and Executive Power
Chapter Two, like Chapter One, focuses on separation of powers, but shifts away
from the Article III courts to the Article II executive branch.36 In this chapter, Rutledge
turns away from commercial and private arbitration and focuses on trade and investment
treaty-based arbitration and the possible intrusion on certain Article II executive
powers.37
Rutledge takes a narrow approach to his examination of the interaction between
arbitration and the executive branch, focusing on issues related to the Appointments
Clause38 and the Take Care Clause.39 More specifically, the text examines the
constitutionality of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 40 To illustrate
his position, Rutledge examines a case involving a dispute over Canadian softwood
lumber, which arose from treaty agreements between the United States and Canada.41
The case raised the question of whether the arbitrators were “officers of the United
States,” and if so, whether vesting others with the power to appoint arbitrators in such

34

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 41.

35

Id. at 53.

36

See U.S. CONST., art. II-III; RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 55.

37

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 55.

38

See U.S. CONST., art. II, §2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein provided for, and which shall be established by Law, but the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or
in the Heads of Departments.”); see also RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 55.
39

See U.S. CONST., art. II, §3 ([The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ...”); see
also RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 64.
40

North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat.
2057 (1993).
41

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 56; see also Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports Executive Comm. v. United
States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also John J Garman and Matthew K Bell, The North American
Free Trade Agreement: Looking at the Binational Panel System Through the Lens of Free Enterprise Fund,
10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 525, 538 (2011) (“The appointment of panelists by foreign governments is
in no way reconcilable with the mandates of the Appointments Clause. ... The Constitution, in no way,
gives foreign powers the authority to appoint panelists.”).
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treaty-disputes usurped the powers vested in the President.42 Rutledge concludes his
examination by stating that “because the mechanism for appointing arbitrators to
binational panels does not aggrandize a coordinate branch of government, it does not run
afoul of the Appointments Clause.”43
Chapter Two concludes with an examination of whether the Appointments Clause
and the Take Care Clause have any effects on private arbitration involving the United
States as a party.44 After utilizing several authorities and conducting a thorough analysis
considering whether and to what extent the United States government can enter into
binding arbitration, Rutledge asserts that private contractual arbitration with the United
States does not offend the Appointments Clause.45 that the Take Care Clause is not an
impediment because, in most cases, there is not a positive law that states the United
States may, or may not, enter into arbitration agreements, therefore, there is no law to
“faithfully execute.”46
Ultimately, Chapter Two asserts that Article II is not an impediment to
arbitration.47 In most contexts, the manner of appointing arbitrators has been found to be
consistent with the Appointments Clause.48 Furthermore, the decision rendered by an
arbitrator does not impinge the President’s power to “Take Care” that the laws of the
United States be “faithfully executed.”49
IV.

PART II: ARBITRATION AND FEDERALISM
A. Chapter Three: Arbitration, State Action

In Chapter Three, Rutledge tackles the problem of federal preemption of state law
under the Supremacy Clause.50 This chapter examines the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, arbitral procedure, and the enforcement of arbitral awards.51

42

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 57.

43

Id. at 63.

44

See U.S. CONST., art. II, §2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST., art. II, §3; RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 70.

45

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 72.

46

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 73.

47

Id. at 74.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United states, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judge in every State shall be bound thereby,
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Starting his examination at federal preemption of state law, Rutledge examines
several well-known Supreme Court cases where federal preemption of state arbitration
law has been upheld.52 In one example, Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme Court
held that Section 2 of the FAA53 preempted a California state franchising law voiding
arbitration clauses in franchise agreements.54 In doing so, the Court first concluded that
Section 2 applied to state court.55 The Court relied on three main justifications for their
decision. First, the court relied on its earlier decision in Prima Paint56 and Moses
Cone57.58 Second, the Court looked to the legislative history of the FAA to determine
that the legislature had intended the FAA to apply in state court.59 Finally, the Court
applied federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements, which required
that Section 2 be applied evenly across state and federal courts.60
Chapter Three moves on to examine federalism and its bearing on arbitral
procedure.61 Rutledge claims that the Supreme Court has shown a “comparatively
greater tolerance of federalism principles in the context of arbitration procedures” than
any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); RUTLEDGE, supra
note 1 at 79.
51

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 81-99.

52

Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 83-86; AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 91-92; Doctors Associates v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681 (1996); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (1967); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 83-86.
53

9 U.S.C. §2 (2006) (“A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such a contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
54

Southland v. Keating, supra note 47.

55

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 83.

56

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., supra note 47 (Stating that Section 2 applied
in a diversity case.).
57

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., supra note 47 (Stating, in dicta, that
Section 2 created substantive federal law that applied to both federal and state courts.).
58

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 83.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 93-97.
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with enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.62 Rutledge argues that this
loosening of federal control is likely an effort “to support arbitration as an institution”63
and allows an opportunity “for state law to play a role in the arbitral procedures.”64
Finally, Chapter Three concludes with an examination of the enforcement of
arbitral awards. Section 10 of the FAA clearly states that its application is limited to U.S.
District courts.65 The limited application of Section 10, coupled with the limits of
removability of arbitration actions to federal court, provides states an opportunity to take
an important role in enforcement proceedings.66 States with anti-arbitration statutes
governing the enforcement of awards have greater power than those governing the
procedural aspects of arbitration.67 This gives the losing party in arbitration proceedings
a great incentive to seek vacatur in the most arbitration-unfriendly forum available to
them.68 Once an arbitral award is vacated, the state’s decision is backed by full faith and
credit principles.69 In this manner, the laws governing enforcement of arbitral awards
grant state courts and legislatures tremendous room to promote anti-arbitration
sentiment.70 Rutledge’s explanation and depth of analysis on this matter was unsatisfying
in its brevity.
B. Chapter Four: Arbitration and Choice of Law
Chapter Four focuses on arbitration agreements and choice of law provisions,
evaluating freedom of contract principles and whether “parties can (and should be able
to) contract around” rules that support federal law.71 Rutledge examines three critical
choice of law provisions.72 First, he examines choice of law clauses in the arbitration
agreements.73
62

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 96.

63

Id. at 97.

64

Id. at 94.

65

9 U.S.C. §10 (2006); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 97.

66

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 97.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 98.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 101.

72

Id. at 104.

73

Id.
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Next, the text moves to choice of forum provisions for the hearing on the merits. Finally,
the chapter moves into choice of forum clauses for any procedural challenges.74
This chapter first focuses on choice of law provisions in the arbitration agreement.
Rutledge utilizes three well known cases75 to reach his claim that the Supreme Court’s
opinion of federal preemption has shifted “from a ‘default’ system to an increasingly
‘mandatory’ one.”76 Rutledge argues that this conclusion is supported by the Court’s
decisions that have trimmed the ability of parties, through choice of law or forum
clauses, to choose favorable state arbitration laws at the expense of federal laws to the
contrary.77
The text then moves to an examination of the “law governing arbitration
proceedings.”78 This section examines “the relationship among federalism, choice and
arbitral procedure,” which has “focused principally on the choices about forums, whether
arbitral or judicial,”79 and to what extent “the choice of forum influence[s] the arbitrator’s
resort to the forum state’s arbitral law.”80 Rutledge argues that choice of forum clauses
may allow the arbitrator to look to state law to determine the procedures to follow, and
also, that the arbitrator might be influenced by the state law grounds for vacatur of
arbitral awards.81
Rutledge focuses on Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle82 to demonstrate the
influence state law can have on arbitration proceedings. In Bazzle, “the arbitrator’s
decision to follow the state court’s reasoning” in an arbitration proceeding “indicated that
an arbitrator wanted to construe state law in the same manner as the state courts in order
to secure an enforceable award.”83 The Court acknowledged that “one of the main goals
of the arbitrators was to render an enforceable award under South Carolina law with
respect to the permissibility of multi-party arbitration.”84
74

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 104.

75

Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
76

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 113.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 113.

80

Id. at 115.

81

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 115.

82

See Green Tree Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003).

83

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 115-16.

84

Id. at 115.
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Choice of forum on the part of the parties can influence the arbitrator to fall back
on the forum state’s arbitral law.85 Arbitrators may look to state law to determine what
procedures should be followed, or they may be influenced by a state’s laws which contain
the grounds for award vacatur.86 Rutledge posits that arbitrators have a natural yearning
to render enforceable awards, and, therefore, may follow state laws as closely as possible
to ensure that their awards are not vacated.87
The end of Chapter Four is devoted to a consideration of how federalism and
personal autonomy correlate with the enforcement of arbitral awards in both state and
federal courts.88 Rutledge examines Hall Street v. Mattel,89 which addresses the parties’
ability to expand judicial review of their arbitral awards by contract.90 Rutledge
examines the issue of federal courts and state courts coming to different conclusions
about the appropriate balance in their enforcement of arbitral awards. 91 The text briefly
goes on to explore the disparity between federal and state enforcement of arbitral awards
and the benefits that protection of federalist values provides.92
V. PART III: ARBITRATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. Chapter Five: Arbitration, State Action and Due Process
Chapter Five initiates the text’s discussion of individual rights by starting with an
evaluation of state action and the Due Process Clauses.93 Rutledge examines whether

85

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 115.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id. at 116.

89

See Hall Street Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).

90

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 117.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 121 (“[F]rom the perspective of federalism values ... [i]t enables parties, through their affirmative
choice, to give effect to state regulatory decisions designed to give even greater effect than the federal
standard. To be sure, the greater diversity of state practice - and the variation from federal practice tolerated by these rules dampens the uniformity goals that animated decisions such as Southland. Yet
perhaps this is a sensible price - at least in cases where the federalism values are wedded with freedom-ofcontract values (that is, giving effect to the parties’ choices about the scope of judicial review of the
award.”).
93

See U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV; RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 127.
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arbitration falls within state and looks to judicial decisions, such as Gilmer in his
evaluation.94
Rutledge concludes that arbitration is not a state action, eliminating any strict
requirement for procedural due process in the arbitration process.95 This does not mean,
however, that there is no constitutional “seepage” which permeates the arbitration
process.96 Constitutional protections and procedural fairness have made their way into the
arbitration process through voluntary due process protocols, implemented by various
sources over time.97
After stating his conclusion, that arbitration is not a state action, the author
presents a question: “If arbitral institutions are not constitutionally obligated to subject
the arbitrations they administer to protections of procedural due process, why have they
chosen to do so voluntarily?”98 To answer this complex question, Rutledge presents four
possible explanations.99
First, the text presents the logical explanation that the “introduction of due
process norms into arbitration is a natural product of the doctrine.”100 This explanation is
grounded in the standards for judicial review of arbitral awards.101 However, this
explanation fails for two reasons.102 One reason is that due process protocols cannot be
explained by this theory, and due process extends more protection than would be
provided under constitutional standards.103 Another reason is that the “logical
explanation cannot account for the timing of the development of the due process
protocols.”104
The second explanation is sociological, arising from literature on the socialization
of attorneys.105 Under this theory, attorneys who partake in alternative dispute resolution
94

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

95

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 145.

96

Id. at 145.

97

Id. at 145-56.

98

Id. at 148.

99

Id. at 149-56.

100

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 148.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 149.

103

Id.

104

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 149-56.

105

Id. at 150.
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have been socialized to observe certain values, including due process and fairness.106
Unfortunately, this theory cannot account for the timing of the development of due
process protocols, nor the initial resistance of arbitration to accept the protocols.107
Additionally, the failure of arbitrators to follow certain rules and enforcement of those
awards is incompatible with this explanation. One would expect that arbitral institutions
would be ensuring that all faulty or unjust arbitral awards were remedied.108
The third possible explanation examined by Rutledge is economic, under which
arbitration can be conceptualized as a product competing against other alternative dispute
resolution services.109 Accordingly, due processes protocols are a way for arbitral
institutions to distinguish themselves and become more appealing to the consumer.110
While this theory is appealing, due process protocols do not favor the arbitral institutions,
but rather the consumer.111 The economic theory creates a system that serves the best
interests of the participants in the arbitral process.112 By serving the parties’ interests, the
arbitral institution reduces the risk of disruption to the process and creates a predictable,
secure proceeding.113 Further, the economic explanation can provide an adequate
explanation to the scope and timing of the protocol’s development, unlike the previous
two theories.114 Providing greater scope to the due process protections under the
protocols than would be minimally available leads the parties to feel more secure in the
arbitral award.115 As to the timing of the protocol’s development, arbitration institutions
began to shift their focus toward procedural fairness after Gilmer.116 Gilmer gave
arbitration institutions the incentive to review and update their due process protocol to
ensure the fairness of their proceedings.117 This theory leaves holes to be examined in

106

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 150.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 151.

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 152.

112

Id. at 154.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 152.

115

Id. at 154.

116

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 154; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

117

Id.
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why arbitral institutions do not have complete due process protocols or protections in
place, requiring a political argument to complete the picture.118
The fourth, and final, explanation is political.119 Rutledge posits that politics
might explain how the norms developed, stating that “[p]rivate norms such as voluntarily
adopted industry standards can regulate private behavior. Public law can form a similar
function.”120 This law can come in various forms, from formal legislation to
administrative agency oversight.121 Rutledge states that “regulation by the protocols
emerged as a second-best solution for the various participants in the arbitral system.122
Chapter Five then turns to an evaluation of ways that due process principles have
entered arbitration over time, especially in international treaties.123 While Rutledge’s
thesis, which states that United States constitutional principles have “seeped” into the
arbitration process may be correct, it is unclear whether United States constitutional
concerns would be relevant to arbitrators or arbitral proceedings abroad. This section of
the book seems incongruous with the author’s thesis. Proving that United States
constitutional norms have infiltrated foreign arbitration affairs would be difficult.
Instead, Rutledge’s argument could have been more convincing if he had focused on
domestic arbitration proceedings, rather than international arbitration.
B. Chapter Six: Arbitration and the Jury Right
The final chapter, Chapter Six, discusses how the constitutionally granted right to
a jury trial is influenced by developments in arbitration law.124 The author delves into
both state and federal law implications, as juries are a facet of both federal and state
proceedings and have an important impact on the outcome of a dispute.125 A subject of
hot debate, some people believe that juries tend to award larger damages than judges.126
Other times, the fear of having their case before a jury is enough to force parties to settle

118

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 155.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.

123

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 156.

124

See U.S. CONST., amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right to jury trial shall be reserved.”); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 170.
125

RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 171.

126

Id.
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before the dispute proceeds to trial.127 Waiver of this important right will likely affect a
litigant’s incentives when it comes to desired outcome of the arbitral proceeding.128
Rutledge moves in Chapter Six to answer the question of whether an arbitration
clause effectively waives a party’s right to a jury trial.129 To answer this question, the
author examines several related questions: (1) whether the right to a jury is waivable at
all; (2) if a waivable right can be disposed of on a pre-dispute basis; and (3) whether the
right, if both waivable and one that can be waived pre-dispute, has in fact been waived by
the parties in the language they choose in their arbitration agreement.130
In examining whether a jury right can be waived, Rutledge states that, in most
instances, constitutional jurisprudence is to recognize the possibility of waiver. 131 To
determine if a right is waivable, the author considers whether a jury right is private (i.e.,
individual) or public in nature.132 Rutledge relies upon the Seventh Amendment, which
includes opportunities for waiver, to establish that the right to a jury is a waivable right
under federal law.133 It is “clear [ ] that parties in noncriminal matters likewise can waive
their rights.”134 The text points out that the ability to alienate one’s jury right is not
without costs, both to the party and to society.135
FAA preemption may provide the escape hatch for dealing with the question of
alienability of one’s state right to a jury. If this were the case, the alienability of one’s
state right to a jury would be preempted by the FAA due to the Supremacy clause. This
line of reasoning is not without flaw, however, because state guarantees to a jury trial are
not blatant anti-arbitration clauses. As such, the state guarantees might be able to survive
a Section 2 challenge.136 If these state guarantees to a trial by jury were in the form of an
anti-arbitration statute, a Section 2 challenge may be more effective. This area of law is
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still developing, and the circumstances under which a waiver is possible is still to be fully
determined.137
The next section of this chapter examines the pre-dispute waiver. Rutledge
explains his argument as follows:
The argument against pre-dispute waiver rests on the assumption
that, until the parties know the complete contours of a dispute, they
lack the necessary information to make a fully informed choice
whether to exercise, or waive, their right to a jury trial. Pre-dispute
arbitration clauses force parties to make a decision about that
important right before they have full (or at least adequate)
information on the nature of their dispute.138
Rutledge acknowledges that pre-dispute arbitration agreements have historically
been acceptable in the United States.139 Concluding this section, the author states that it
is “therefore unsurprising that the most serious debates have turned not on the categorical
possibility (or impossibility) of pre-dispute waiver but, instead, the conditions under
which such waiver can be effective.”140
The final section of Chapter Six involves an examination of the requisite language
to waive the right to a trial by jury.141 The text describes various safeguards that are
implemented in other proceedings before a party can waive an individual right.142
Rutledge examines several of these methods, including the cooling-off period, witnesses,
attorneys, pendency of the litigation, and judges.143
After an analysis of various waivers of other types of procedural rights, Rutledge
provides his own variation to the pre-dispute jury waiver.144 He examines the possibility
of including an explicit jury waiver in the arbitration agreement, which he argues would
provide “the clearest evidence that the assent to arbitration includes an assent to waiver of
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jury right.”145 Less convincing, he states that an arbitration clause, which contains
provisions where a party gives up their “right to litigate claims ‘through a court,’” could
be read to imply consent to a waiver of a jury right. 146 Finally, Rutledge mentions the
general arbitration clause, without elaborate mention of one’s jury right.147 In these
cases, Rutledge justifies the dismissal of one’s jury right to the assumption that “when a
party [agrees] to arbitration, it is understood what arbitration meant.”148
Following his analysis, Rutledge concludes that a standard arbitration clause
containing language sufficient to put the parties on notice of the rights that they are
waiving should be considered a valid waiver of the party’s right to a jury trial.149
VI.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration and the Constitution contains a brief conclusion that acts as a
summary for the major themes of the book.150 Rutledge states that the wall between
arbitration and the constitution, while once quite solid and firm, “endures today, but is
not as firm as it was a century or even a half-century ago. The past six chapters have
sought to describe the contours of the wall, the areas of seepage, and the consequences of
that seepage.”151
The first theme encompassed in this book is the limited doctrinal impact that the
constitution has had on arbitration law.152 While there have, doubtless, been
constitutional impacts on arbitration law, the constitutional values have not affected
arbitration to the extent of “direct doctrinal incorporation.”153
A second theme examined in this book was the sub-doctrinal influences asserted
upon arbitration law, such as international treaties and due process protocols.154 Without
direct doctrinal incorporation, arbitration institutions have been influenced by
constitutional limits in a softer and less concrete manner.155
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Finally, the third theme of this book was the “dialogic influence[].”156 As stated
by Rutledge, “[t]hat is, because the debate over constitutional principles in arbitration
takes place at the sub-constitutional level, it facilitates a far greater dialogue between
institutions of the state as well as with private parties.”157
Arbitration and the Constitution is a very brief overview of the constitutional
principles engaged in arbitration proceedings. Rutledge does a fabulous job presenting
his thesis of the “seepage” of constitutional norms into the arbitration sphere, while
backing up his research and claims with a mix of case law and writings by other experts
in the field. While it was clear that the author’s goal was to present a boiled-down and
digestible version of his claims, there were several instances where subjects could have
been provided with much greater breadth and detail to make them more understandable to
a someone unfamiliar with the field. In some instances, his use of many foreign treaties
and commercial arbitration agreements muddied his points and were confusing as he
attempted to tie them back into United States constitutional and arbitration law principles.
I would recommend this book to individuals wishing to explore the intersection of
constitutional and arbitration law in many areas where the case law is still developing.
This book is written to be accessible to readers with various levels of proficiency in the
subject, not only specialists within the field of arbitration law. The brevity of this book,
while occasionally doing its content a disservice, provides a satisfying, but not overly
burdensome, overview to the reader of the current state of the law regarding arbitration
and the Constitution. Rutledge does a thorough job confronting both sides of many
possible arguments for and against different aspects of arbitration law with respect to the
United States Constitution.
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